distinction between the financing and the delivery of healthcare is blurred in the context of managed care, leading to endless debate over whether lawsuits challenging managed care activities, such as utilization review are preempted. c.
Conflicting Post-Pegram ERISA Preemption Cases: (i) Cases Finding ERISA Does Not Preempt Challenges to Managed Care Activities
In the wake of Pegram v. Herdrich, some courts are more reluctant to find ERISA preemption when managed care organizations or healthcare providers employ medical judgment in determining benefit eligibility. For example, see Cicio v. Does, 321 F. 3d 83 (2 nd Cir. 2003) where the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that an enrollee in an ERISA governed health plan may state a medical malpractice cause of action under state law against a health plan and its medical director based on their utilization review determinations if those determinations are alleged to involve medical decisions or 'mixed eligibility and treatment' decisions. The court stated: "By denying one treatment and authorizing another that had not been specifically requested, Dr. Spears [the medical director] at least seems to have engaged in patient-specific prescription of an appropriate treatment, and, ultimately, a medical decision."
See also Pappas v. Asbel, 564 Pa 407, 768, A.2d 1089 (2001 where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that ERISA does not preempt a state law claim asserting that an HMO was negligent in providing medical benefits to a plan member when it refused to authorize coverage at a non-HMO hospital recommended by the treating physician, stating: Cir. 2002) finding several consolidated claims against health plans based on the Texas Healthcare Liability Act were not preempted by ERISA because they were based on a statutorily imposed duty of care running from the Plan's physicians to the plan participants. The unanimous panel did affirm the dismissal of one of the consolidated claims because it challenged the plan's denial of benefits allegedly due and was therefore preempted by ERISA pursuant to the 5 th Circuit's prior ruling in Corcoran v. eligibility decisions, treatment decisions, and mixed decisions of treatment and eligibility. Regardless of who makes these decisions, they are all decisions which affect beneficiaries. We find no principled way to distinguish between a mixed decision of eligibility and treatment rendered by a physician employed by an HMO (as in Pegram) and a mixed decision eligibility and treatment rendered by a physician engaged by a third-party administrator to make such decisions (as in the instant case). . . [W]e fail to see how, under the Pegram regime, the nature of the enterprise-HMO or third party administrator-is a pertinent factor in determining whether ERISA completely occupies the field.
In Cicio, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals also rejected the notion that the nature of the enterprise (i.e. HMO or third party administrator) makes any difference, in evaluating whether particular activities constitute mixed eligibility and treatment decisions.
4.
Divided The plaintiff-employee was a beneficiary of an ERISA governed "fee for service" health plan. The plan was funded by a health insurance policy issued to the plaintiff's employer by an insurance company which retained a separate third party administrator to make benefit decisions. Plaintiff-employee contracted leukemia and on August 10, 1999, her treating physician requested authorization to perform a bone marrow transplantation. By letter dated August 25, 1999, the third party administrator denied coverage since it was not "medically necessary." This initial decision was modified on September 23, 1999, when the third party administrator gave "conditional approval" for the transplant. The plaintiff-employee died on October 7, 1999, before any transplant was undertaken. 6 .
While the Illinois law at issue clearly "relates to" ERISA within the meaning of Section 514, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the 3 Section 4-10 of the HMO Act requires an HMO to submit for independent physician review any dispute between a patient's primary care physician and the HMO that involves treatment being refused on the grounds of "medical necessity." In the event the independent reviewer determines that treatment is medically necessary, the HMO Act requires the insurer to cover the treatment. 4 The plaintiff in Moran requested that her HMO, Rush Prudential, cover a particular kind of surgery that an out-of-network physician had recommended to treat the decreased mobility that she was experiencing in her right shoulder. Rush denied coverage for that surgery and instead offered to cover all of the costs associated with a different type of surgery to be performed by an HMO affiliated doctor. Moran sought external review of Rush's denial of coverage, and in the meantime, paid for the surgery recommended by the out-of-network physician herself at a cost of $95,000. An independent reviewer found the services provided to Moran by the out-of-network physician were medically necessary, but Rush still denied Moran's claim. Moran then sought reimbursement under Section 4-10 of the Illinois HMO Act by bringing an action in state court. Rush removed the action to federal court on ERISA preemption grounds. Eventually, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois determined that Moran made a claim for benefits that was preempted by ERISA.
5
While ERISA preemption invalidates any state law that "relates to" a covered employee benefits plan, the most notable exception is the savings clause, which holds that a state law "relat [ing] to" an ERISA plan may avoid preemption if the state law "regulates insurance." law is nonetheless saved from ERISA preemption because, from a "common sense view," it regulates the insurance industry 7 . According to the court, the Illinois law clearly regulates integral parts of policy relationships between insurers and the insured by adding "an extra layer of review when there is internal disagreement about an HMO's denial of coverage." While the state law may "settle the fate of a benefit claim, " the Court held that the law "does not enlarge the claim beyond the benefits available in any action under ERISA's civil enforcement provision."
The majority in Moran also found that the state law did not interfere with Congress' intention to provide a uniform regime under ERISA. The court distinguished the independent review statute from arbitration provisions, saying the independent review provisions were more similar to a doctor's "second opinion" than a binding arbitral decision. "The Act does not give the independent review a free-ranging power to construe contract terms, but instead, confines review to a single term; the phrase "medical necessity" used to define the services covered under the contract."
The Moran decision is a mixed bag for HMOs. The Moran decision is favorable to HMOs in that that it reaffirms an expansive reading of the "relate to" provision in ERISA's express preemption provision. The members of the Court agreed that if the state independent review law was not an insurance regulation, it would be preempted as a provision related to an ERISA plan. Also, the ruling arguably reaffirms that a state law purporting to regulate insurance may nonetheless be preempted by ERISA if it conflicts with remedies established under the federal law. The decision is unfavorable for HMOs because: (1) it confirms that they must comply with a patchwork quilt of state independent review laws; and (2) fails to address whether a state could supplant health plan language by adopting a new or different definition of "medical necessity" or standard of review for the second opinion. Some commentators have suggested that it would have been better if the court had upheld the independent review law with the caveat that 7
In rejecting Rush's argument that HMOs should be immune from state regulation as members of the insurance industry since HMOs also provide health care, the Court held that "nothing in the saving clause requires an either-or choice between health care and insurance in deciding a preemption question, as long as providing insurance fairly accounts for the application of state law, the savings clause may apply." Likewise, the majority rejected Rush's argument that the Illinois HMO Act "sweeps too broadly within the definitions capturing organizations that provide no insurance, and by regulating non-insurance activities of HMOs that do." the reviewer is to use the definition of medical necessity contained in the health plan.
Note, the impact of Moran will be limited since it only applies to insured plans and has no effect on self-funded health benefit plans. See, Corporate Health v. Texas Department of Insurance, 314 F. 3d 784 (5 th Cir. 2002)(on remand from the Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit modified its earlier opinion concerning ERISA preemption of laws mandating independent external review, but only for insured plans. The Fifth Circuit maintained that ERISA still preempts the independent review law for self-funded plans because the savings clause does not apply to save the state statute as it applies to self-funded plans.
5.
In 9 Judge Buckwalter disagreed with Judge Newcomer on two key points. On the second factor of the McCarran-Ferguson test, Judge Buckwalter found that the bad-faith statue does not serve as "an integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and the insured" because it doesn't "change the bargain between an insurer and insured." According to the Sprecher court, insurers already have the obligation to act in good faith and "a state statute providing a remedy for breach of this obligation does not have the effect of creating a new, mandatory contract term." Instead, the Sprecher court found the bad faith statute simply creates an opportunity for a policyholder whose claim has been improperly handled by the insurer, to seek punitive damages and interest penalties.
Secondly, Judge Buckwalter found that, even if he were to hold that the bad faith law qualified for protection from preemption under ERISA's savings clause, the law would nonetheless be preempted because "its provision for interest penalties and punitive damages, is more akin to an "alternative remedy" which is categorically preempted by ERISA." Because Pennsylvania's bad faith statute provides a form of ultimate relief in a judicial forum that adds to the judicial remedies provided by ERISA, Judge Buckwalter found it is incompatible with ERISA' exclusive enforcement scheme. In Sprecher, the plaintiff, an enrollee under an ERISA benefits plan, filed suit against his health insurer for its partial failure to pay hospital expenses he incurred after suffering a heart attack. Count I of plaintiffs complaint was filed under ERISA to recover benefits while Count II is a state statutory bad faith claim.
amounts to an alternate enforcement mechanism outside of the exclusive remedial scheme.
In Bell v. Unum Provident Corp., 222 F. Supp. 2d 692 (E.D. Pa. 2002) , Judge Baylson also ruled that the Pennsylvania bad faith statute was preempted and not "saved by ERISA's "savings clause" because it conflicts with ERISA's exclusive remedies. Judge Baylson noted that while Ward and Rush addressed claims dealing with the processing of a claim for benefits, neither provided an alternative enforcement remedy to those set forth by ERISA §502(a) (1) In its most recent pronouncement on the subject, the Supreme Court again confirmed that any state law "providing a form of ultimate relief in a judicial forum that add[s] to the judicial remedies provided by ERISA . . . . patently violates ERISA's policy of inducing employers to offer benefits by assuring a predictable set of liabilities, under uniform standards of primary conduct and a uniform regime of ultimate remedial orders and wards when a violation has occurred."
U.S. Supreme Court Rules That Kentucky's Any Willing Provider Law Is Saved From Preemption
In that defendants made misrepresentations in marketing their health plans to subscribers by failing to disclose internal managed care cost control mechanisms. The subscribers alleged that the hidden cost control measures rendered the health plans worth less than those for which the subscribers bargained. None of the subscribers alleged actual denial of benefits, delay in care or other concrete injury).
(iii) Multi-District Litigation.
Purported subscriber class actions have been filed against the largest for-profit health insurers and HMOs, alleging RICO violations similar to those in Maio as well as ERISA violations. The court ruled that the McCarran-Ferguson Act, a law that Congress passed to prohibit federal lawsuits that encroach upon each state's right to regulate insurance, barred the ten plaintiffs from California, Florida, New Jersey and Virginia from maintaining their RICO suits. In support, the court pointed to the insurance fraud laws in these four states that do not allow individuals to maintain private causes of action. Rather, these actions must be filed by the appropriate government regulatory body. Thus, the court found that the state insurance fraud laws barred the subscriber's federal RICO claims since such claims would encroach upon each state's regulatory decision to not allow private causes of action. (ii) In the Multi-District litigation, the plaintiff subscribers allege that the defendants breached their fiduciary duty under ERISA by misrepresenting benefits in plan summaries, determining "medical necessity" using financial criteria and not disclosing that criteria, and interfering with communication between doctors and patients. As a result, the plaintiffs claim to have sustained injury in that they paid more for insurance coverage than they would have absent the HMO's alleged misrepresentation and exaggerations of plan benefits. The plaintiff subscribers asserted all of their breach of fiduciary duty claims under ERISA's "catch all" claim provision which allows subscribers and, in some cases, former subscribers to bring a civil action to enjoin any act which violates the term of the Plan or any provision of ERISA and to obtain appropriate equitable (including restitution and monetary damages) and injunctive relief.
(iii) In his February 20, 2002 ruling, Judge Moreno dismissed a number of the subscribers' ERISA claims, including the ERISA medical necessity fiduciary duty claims by subscribers who are still enrolled in their health plans under the ERISA catch all claim section. Since the subscribers are essentially alleging fraudulent inducement to purchase an insurance contract by misrepresenting medical necessity criteria, Judge Moreno held that their claims should be characterized as an ERISA claim for benefits rather than as an ERISA breach of fiduciary duty claim. 12 The ruling is significant as it drastically restricts the remedies available to those plaintiffs to health benefits, and possibly plaintiffs' attorneys' fees. However, Judge Moreno allowed all subscribers to maintain their claims that the defendants breached their fiduciary duties under ERISA by "improperly interfering with physician-patient communication by imposing "gag orders" on doctors" and not discharging their duties "solely in the interest" of the participants and beneficiaries. While most managed care organizations no longer utilize gag orders in their contracts with providers, the subscriber suits challenge managed care methodologies employed by the defendants dating back to 1991.
2.
Provider Class Actions
12
As to the subscribers who are no longer members of a plan, Judge Moreno noted that they have no adequate remedy under ERISA's claim for benefits provision for their breach of medical necessity fiduciary duty claims since this section of ERISA limits those who can seek recourse to current subscribers only. Thus, the former plaintiff subscribers' only recourse to recover for the defendants' alleged misrepresentation is under the ERISA catch all claim provision which presumably allows the plaintiff former subscribers to pursue restitutionary and other equitable relief. Judge Moreno cautioned the former subscribers that their medical necessity misrepresentation claims must conform with his prior rulings that neither the summary plan document requirements nor ERISA's general fiduciary duty obligations require a plan administrator to disclose financial incentives paid to physicians or employees. As discussed in Section D3 below, many providers have also been alleging antitrust violations and unfair trade practices.
Cir., NO. 01-10247. The managed care defendants petition for certiorari was granted and the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments on February 24, 2003. The plaintiff providers argued that, since treble damages under RICO are punitive in nature and the provider arbitration agreements preclude an award of punitive damages, the arbitration agreements are unenforceable as they restrict the physician plaintiffs' ability to vindicate their RICO claims. However, the defendants argued that the provider agreements are enforceable and the RICO Claims should be arbitrated since the arbitration agreements limitation on punitive damages would not prevent an award of RICO treble damages.
On April 7, 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals finding that the proper course was to compel arbitration of the providers' RICO claims. Pacificare Health Systems, Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. ____(2003) . The Pacificare Court found that it was premature for it to address the question of whether the remedial limitations require invalidation of the arbitration agreements. In delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Scalia recognized that the U.S. Supreme Court cases have placed different statutory treble damage provisions on different points along the spectrum between purely compensatory and strictly punitive awards.
Thus, it is unclear whether the agreements actually prevent an arbitrator from awarding treble damages under RICO. Since the Court did not know how the arbitrator would construe the remedial limitations and whether such remedial limitations would render the parties' agreement unenforceable, it declined to address these issues and held that the arbitration clause is, at least, initially enforceable.
b.
ERISA Violations
The providers in the In Re Humana Managed Care Litigation also made a claim for "unpaid benefits" under ERISA. (Their ERISA claim was asserted in the alternative to their state law breach of provider contract claims which the defendants asserted were preempted by ERISA.) The defendants moved to dismiss the providers' ERISA claims for lack of standing (the providers were suing in their own rights, not under assignments of the rights of plan participants or beneficiaries) and for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The court has not addressed these arguments because it held that the providers' breach of contract claims are not preempted by ERISA. In denial of benefit cases involving medical judgment, the Senate bill would have permitted a subscriber that has suffered injury or death to pursue all available relief under state law, including extra-contractual relief. However, the House version of the bill would have capped non-economic damages at $1.5 million and punitive Bush indicated that he would veto the Senate passed bill. While Senate aides and White House representatives were reportedly negotiating the terms of compromise legislation on the liability portion of the bills, efforts have apparently been abandoned, in part, because of the House of Representative's recent passage of the Medical Malpractice Liability Act, discussed below.
D. Increased Frequency of Individual Provider Suits and Attorney General
However, on March 3, 2003, Representative Charlie Norwood introduced into the House of Representatives Patient Protection legislation (H.R. 597) which incorporates the noncontroversial provisions of the 2001 patient protection legislation with respect to a health insurers' provision of (1) emergency care; (2) obstetric and gynecologic care; (3) specialists care; (4) prescription drugs; (5) participation in approved clinical trials; and (6) health plan information. The newly proposed patient rights legislation would also, among other things, amend ERISA to require MCOs to have approved utilization review programs, internal and external claims procedures, etc. Significantly, H.R. 597 does not address the liability of MCO's for wrongful denial of benefit claims in cases where the MCO employs medical judgment.
B. Medical Malpractice Liability Act
On March 13, 2003, the House of Representatives passed legislation (H.R. 5) which, among other things, places a federal limit of $250,000 on non-economic (pain and suffering) damages in health care lawsuits and caps punitive damages at the greater of twice the amount of noneconomic damages or $250,000. Health care lawsuits are defined to include a demand by any person against a health care provider or health care organization which are based upon the provision of, use of, or payment for (or the failure to provide, use or pay for) health services, regardless of the theory of liability on which the claim is based and whether it is brought in state or federal court. The proposed legislation would apply to managed care organizations and administrators of health benefits plans since these entities would arguably qualify as Health Care Organizations under the Act 16 . However, H.R 5 would not preempt any state law enacted before or after it that sets higher or lower damage caps for health care lawsuits; it only applies in states with no caps on damages. Moreover, H.R. 5 would not supersede any state or federal law "that imposes greater procedural or substantive protections for health care providers or organizations from liability, loss, or damages than those provided by this Act or create a cause of action." President Bush has endorsed the bill and urged Senate action on it, but commentators believe that it will be tough to navigate the bill through the Senate. Republicans in the Senate are reportedly preparing similar legislation but Senator Judd Gregg (R-N.H.), Chairman of the Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee advises that the range of lawsuits covered in the Senate GOP bill would not be as broad as in the House measure which extends to health care liability suits filed against pharmaceutical makers. Moreover, commentators anticipate pressure damages at $1.5 million. Moreover, under the House version of the bill, punitive damages would only have been available if a health plan failed to comply with the independent medical reviewer's decision that the claim for health benefits should be granted. 16 The Act defines Health Care Organization as "any person or entity which is obligated to provide or pay for health benefits under any health plan, including any person or entity acting under contract or arrangement with a health care organization to provide or administer any health benefit."
